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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, 7 Amendment 8 
Utah Constitution: Article 1 Section 7 8,37 
Utah Constitution: Article I, Section 11 8,37 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of 
the October 3, 2011, Order by the Honorable James R. Taylor granting 
summary judgment to UCCU and dismissing Robertson's Counterclaim and 
denying Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Did the District Court 
err in granting summary judgment when controverted material facts exist and 
where no discovery had taken place? Did the District Court err when it ruled 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1 -31 did not apply? Did the District Court err in 
granting standing that UCCU had complied with contract terms to accelerate 
and bring a judicial action? And did the District Court err in dismissing 
Robertson's counterclaim without giving him Due Process and Open Courts 
rights to his Day in Court and trial by jury? 
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
"We review a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court." See Ford v. American 
Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70,121, 98 P.3d 15. A party is entitled to 
summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Additionally, "[f]or a moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, 
it must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to 
the undisputed facts." Smith v. Four Corners Med. Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 
23,124, 70 P.3d 904. "In determining whether the lower court correctly found 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing 
party" Dwiggins v Morgan Jewelers, 811 P2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) In other 
words, "we review the factual submissions to the trial court in a light most 
favorable to finding a material issue of fact." Versluis v Guaranty Nati Cos., 
842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) "We generally review a trial court's discovery 
rulings for an abuse of discretion," see, e.g., Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W Dev„ 2006 UT App 48, ID 3,129 P.3d 287, but when 
a trial court does not rule on outstanding discovery motions and thereby fails 
7 
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to exercise its discretion, "the issue of whether or not it 
should have [decided the outstanding motions] presents a legal question 
which is subject to de novo review." Energy Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Shaw, 
2005 UT App 90, ID8, 110 P.3d 158 Appellant review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.'" 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). "Utah case law 
teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law."Pena,869P.2dat935. 
The issues were preserved for appeal in Defendants Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 645-705) 
and Defendants Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R.768-863) and Defendant's Objection to Proposed 
Order. (R.965-1005) 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, 7 Amendment: In Suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Utah Constitution: Article 1 Section 7. No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution: Article I, Section 11. All courts shall be open, and 
every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
8 
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shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (addendum a) 
Rule 6. Time (addendum b) 
Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery, 
(addendum c) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment, (addendum d) 
RESPA 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (addendum e) 
FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (addendum f) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In May of 2009 Robertson obtained a loan for the purchase of a 
property from UCCU. Upon closing, UCCU tried to transfer the loan to Wells 
Fargo Bank. Wells Fargo refused to purchase the loan and UCCU began 
efforts to force Robertson to pay off the loan. First by a letter of collections 
demanding payment in full by their collection agent, James "Tucker" Hansen 
and threatening foreclosure if not paid. Then by a Non Judicial foreclosure 
proceeding in November of 2009 which was ended in May of 2010. Then by a 
Judicial action in June of 2010 resulting in an order granting summary 
judgment in November 2011. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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On or near May 1, 2009, Mike L. Robertson, Sr., hereafter Robertson, 
applied for a loan from Utah Community Credit Union, hereafter UCCU, to 
enable the purchase of real property located in Spanish Fork, Utah. (R.268) 
UCCU faxed Robertson a loan application along with several other 
documents for him to read and sign. (R.267, 514) Robertson read and signed 
the loan application and faxed it along with income statements for the 
previous two years and a copy of the Real estate purchase contract. The 
income statements were unsigned. (R.268) On May 1, 2009, Keven Banks 
said they had received these forms, and that the Loan application was not 
dated. He requested Robertson date the application and return it. This 
Robertson did. There was no mention that the income forms needed to be 
either signed or dated. (R.268) UCCU never requested signed and filed 
income tax returns. The Loan Application stated that "Self employed 
Borrower(s) may be required to provide additional documentation such as tax 
returns and financial statements" (R.ll, 268) They never did request any. 
Robertson advised UCCU that the purchase of this home was a "second" 
home and that Robertson was going to retain the first home. UCCU 
requested a letter stating such and giving a reason for doing so. The reason for 
the purchase was to have a place to store Robertson's belongings while he left 
to serve a mission for his church. (R.266-268) Robertson complied with all 
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the requests of UCCU in the application process. Robertson was notified by 
Kevin Banks that the loan had been approved and to plan to close on May 28, 
2009. (R.268-269) On May 28, 2009 UCCU and Robertson entered into a 
Note in the amount of $148,800.00 to be paid in monthly installments 
beginning on July 1, 2009 and ending on June 1, 2039 with interest at 4.75%. 
UCCU and Robertson also entered into a Deed of Trust as a security 
instrument to enforce and secure the payment of the terms of the Note. 
(R.30-46,59) On the first day the house was available to move into and while 
moving items into the house, Robertson received a letter from James "Tucker" 
Hansen acting as a collection agent for UCCU demanding Robertson pay in 
full the total amount of the loan and threatening foreclosure if Robertson did 
not do so. This caused Robertson to cease moving into the home. (R.271) 
Robertson made the first house payment on June 30,2009 and has made every 
payment in full on the date set forth in the Trust Deed Note. (R.796) 
Robertson mailed a letter on July 25, 2009, to James "Tucker" Hansen that 
challenged the amount owed or that Robertson was in default and asked for 
him to check the facts again. James "Tucker" Hansen did not responded to 
Robertson's request. (R.271,834) 
On November 9, 2009 UCCU commenced a Non Judicial foreclosure 
action by recording a Notice of Substitution of Trustee naming James 
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"Tucker" Hansen as Successor Trustee and a Notice of Default. (R.273,771) 
Included with these notices was a letter by James "Tucker" Hansen 
demanding that Robertson cure the default under Utah Code 57-1-31. (R.794) 
On December 1, 2009, Robertson entered a branch office of UCCU and 
requested the amount necessary to cure the default under Utah Code 57-1-31. 
UCCU called their special collections unit, which called their legal 
department. The amount was determined by UCCU, and Robertson paid that 
amount in cash and received a receipt for such. (R.832 ) On December 4, 
2009, Robertson wrote a letter to James "Tucker" Hansen stating that he had 
cured the default and requested a cancellation of the Notice of Default. 
(R.273) On December 21, 2009, Robertson received a loan Statement in 
writing from UCCU showing reinstatement with an amount due on 01/01/10 
of $885.93. (R.814) On January 9, 2010, the Defendant sent another letter 
stating that they had not responded as required by law and again asked that a 
cancellation of the Notice of Default be recorded. (R.274) UCCU did not 
respond to either of these notifications as required under Section 6 of RESPA 
(12 U.S.C. 2605) (R.273-274) On May 26, 2010, James "Tucker" Hansen 
signed and recorded a Cancellation of Notice of Default, entry 43446:2010 
Utah County Recorder. (R.849) On June 25, 2010, Plaintiff initiated this 
Judicial Complaint under Utah Code Ann. 78B-3-301 and 78B-3-304 
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requesting judgment in the amount of $151,384.73 plus interest of 4.75%, 
plus attorney's fees and costs. (R.l, 4) 
UCCU did not comply with the initial disclosure provisions of Rule 26 (a)(1) 
and 26(a)(2) and thus no discovery has been taken on this action to date. 
(R.l 11-114) UCCU has failed to comply with the requirements contained in 
the Deed of Trust under section 20 before any judicial action may take place 
between the parties and the notice requirements under section 15 prior to the 
commencement of any judicial action. (R.649-650, 664) On December 6, 
2010, a Memorandum Decision was issued stating: "Robertson is in default 
under the Deed of Trust because he provided material misleading information 
during the loan application process and because he has failed to occupy the 
property within 60 days of closing." "UCCU has failed to comply with the 
contract requirement for acceleration of the balance due. The request for 
immediate judgment and authorization to continue with the trustee's sale 
must, for the present, be denied." (R.546) 
UCCU then presented evidence of the letter sent on or about May 24, 2010, 
(R.635-636) as compliance with contract requirements, but failed to mail it to 
address required in the contract. In the District Court's June 1, 2011 
Memorandum Decision it found that the May 24, 2010 letter was sufficient 
and granted summary judgment and ruled against Robertson's counter claim. 
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(R.866-878) Robertson then appealed that decision to this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
No Discovery has taken place on this case, and a rule 56(f) motion was 
made and never ruled on. There were discrepancies as to what amounts were 
owed and what payments had been made and credited, this is a disputed 
material fact that was never addressed. There were disputed issues as to what 
was provided and what was asked for in the application process and the 
district court made a ruling of fact on disputed issues. There is also a question 
of what facts are actually material. The court used the wrong standard as to if 
Robertson was within the contract when he failed to move in. A defense that 
Robertson had cured under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was never considered 
even though UCCU first chose a non judicial foreclosure and demanded 
Robertson cure under 57-1-31. UCCU does not have standing in this action as 
it failed to comply with the contract requirements before any judicial action 
could commence. The U.S. and Utah Constitutions provide rights to a trial 
that have been denied to Robertson. All of these preclude summary 
judgment and this court should reverse and remand. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHEN NO DISCOVERY HAD TAKEN PLACE. 
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No discovery has taken place by UCCU or Robertson in this action. A 
Rule 56(f) motion was made in Robertson's Memorandum in opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court never ruled upon 
it. In the Motion to Enter Scheduling Order of October 4, 2010, UCCU 
states, "Plaintiff's counsel proposes in this motion that the deadline for initial 
disclosures be set as October 20, 2010."(R.53-56) and in the Scheduling 
Order of October 4, 2010, "Initial Disclosures: The parties shall exchange 
their initial disclosures, as required by Rule 26, on or before October 20, 
2010. (R.lll-114) That never happened. Plaintiff has never complied with the 
initial discovery disclosures provided under Rule 26(a)(1) and thus effectively 
barred Defendant of a right to discovery under Rule 26(A)(2) AND (C)(2): 
(a)(2) Timing of initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph 
(a)(1) shall be made: 
(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after service of the first 
answer to the complaint; and 
(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 28 days after the plaintiff's first 
disclosure or after that defendant's appearance, whichever is later. 
26(c)(2). 
(c)(2) Sequence and timing of discovery. Methods of discovery may 
be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting 
discovery shall not delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases 
exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party may not seek discovery 
from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations 
are satisfied, (emphasis added)(addendum c) 
15 
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Many issues of material fact were not able to be addressed without proper 
discovery in this case and still exist. 
On November 1, 2010, Robertson in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed a Rule 56(f) motion. In part it 
states, "Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has conducted discovery. The issues 
that need to be ferreted out are many. Discovery should allow the parties to 
seek answers as to what went wrong in the Plaintiff's loan process. The best 
that can be said now is that the Plaintiff says the documents presented amount 
to an income tax return and the Defendant emphatically stating that whatever 
was given was never an income tax filing, and was not presented nor intended 
as such." (R.297) The Trial Court never addressed this motion. 
All dealings between Robertson and UCCU in the Loan Application 
process were handled by Kevin Banks. We have no affidavit, interrogatories 
or deposition in this matter from Kevin Banks. How can we know what was 
asked for or understood by UCCU's agent without some sort of information 
from the only person with whom Robertson had contact? 
"Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is 
incomplete since information sought in discovery may create genuine 
issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Downtown 
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct.App.l987).In 
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particular, "it is error for a trial court to grant summary judgment 
without addressing a pending rule 56(f) motion, absent an indication 
from the record that the motion is meritless or dilatory on its face." 
Energy Mgmt. Servs., LLC v Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, f 10, 110 P.3d 
158. 
On December 6, 2010, the Trial court entered a ruling granting 
Summary Judgment against Robertson without ruling on the 56(f) motion or 
giving Robertson the opportunity to question the only person with whom 
Robertson had contact with at UCCU. The information sought would have 
shed light on many genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
Motion. The District Court committed error in not allowing the Defendant to 
do so. This court should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand 
for further proceedings. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN CONTESTED MATERIAL 
FACTS WERE NEVER FULLY ADDRESSED AS TO AMOUNTS 
OWED. 
The Trust Deed Note is in the original principal amount of One 
Hundred and Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars (148,800.00) 
bearing interest at 4.75% per annum. In UCCU's complaint, paragraph 21 
states: "Defendant is in default of payment under the Note, and the balance 
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due on said Note is in the sum of One Hundred and Fifty-One Thousand Three 
Hundred and Eighty-Four Dollars and Seventy-Three Cents (151,384.73) as 
of May 24, 2010, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 4.75% until paid in full, 
plus attorney's fees and costs incurred after May 24, 2010." (R.4) Robertson 
disputed those balances. Robertson contends that he has made each and every 
payment of interest and a reduction of principal on the due date provided for 
in the Note and has never been in default of the Note, yet not a single 
payment has been credited to the amount UCCU claims Robertson now owes 
which is greater than the original amount borrowed. 
On May 19, 2010, Robertson received a written Loan Statement from 
UCCU stating that the Amount Due was $900.82 and Robertson agrees with 
this amount. Robertson contends that UCCU has failed to follow the terms of 
the Trust Deed Note and no acceleration of the Note could have occurred on 
or before May 24, 2010, but even if that was the case, the Loan Statement of 
May 19, 2010, shows a principal balance of $146,699.45, not the $151,384.73 
UCCU claims. (R.808) 
In the First Affidavit of Jeff Meyers of September 30, 2010, paragraph 
3 acknowledges the original amount of $148,800.00 (R.89) and then also 
states, in paragraph 13 that the amount owed is $151,384.73 as of May 24, 
2010. (R.90) This fails to acknowledge payments made by Robertson each 
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and every month on the due date of the Note which have been paid in full and 
on time. In the Second Affidavit of Jeff Meyers it states, "Plaintiff has 
accelerated the loan, and Defendant's loan is due and payable in full in the 
principal and interest amount of One Hundred and Forty Five Thousand One 
Hundred and Two Dollars and Eighty Cents (145,108.80) as of February 11, 
2011, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 4.75% until paid in full, plus 
attorney's fees and costs incurred." (R.639) 
On February 18, 2011, Robertson received a written Loan Statement 
from UCCU stating that the Amount Due was $900.82, and Robertson agrees 
with this amount. The Loan Statement also shows a Principal Balance of 
$144,911.60 on that date. (R.816) 
This contested material fact was never fully addressed by the District 
Court and precludes summary judgment. In the district court's Memorandum 
Decision of December 6, 2010, page 6 states, "UCCU has asserted a balance 
due in connection with this motion (paragraphs 14 and 15 and affidavit of Jeff 
Meyers). Robertson disputes those balances." (R.544) The court then 
concludes that UCCU had failed to follow the plain language of the contract 
and cannot at the present time accelerate the loan, but does not address the 
discrepancy even if they are later able to accelerate. (R.546-547) 
This fact was not addressed in the District Court's second 
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memorandum decision granting Summary Judgment. The amounts owed and 
payments made are in dispute. This is a contested material fact that is 
controverted and can only be addressed by a Jury. 
"When testimonial evidence and affidavits are in conflict as to 
payments under a trust deed note, and documentary evidence is 
inconclusive, a genuine issue of material fact exists and summary 
judgment is inappropriate. See, e.g., Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 
850 P.2d 487, 491 n. 3 (Utah Ct.App.1993)." 
This court should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for 
further proceedings. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN REGARDS TO MISREPRESENTION IN THE 
APPLICATION PROCESS, 
Under the Deed of Trust, Paragraph 8, "Borrower shall be in default if, 
during the loan application process," he "gave materially false, misleading, or 
inaccurate information or statements to lender.... In connection with the 
Loan." (R.35) In order to determine whether a breach is "material" the Court 
should have looked to the intent of the parties, and the extent to which the 
injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected. 
That benefit is clearly spelled out in the "Note" entered into by both parties 
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and which Robertson is not in breach of. (R.44-46) If tax returns were 
material, they should have been asked for. Robertson contends in his 
affidavit that he was never asked for nor provided any. (R.268) The loan 
application states: "Self employed Borrower(s) may be required to provide 
additional documentation such as tax returns and financial statements". (R.ll) 
The word "may" requires an additional act upon the part of the lender that 
never took place nor did UCCU present any evidence that it did. UCCU 
asserted that Robertson submitted Individual Income Tax returns for 2007 and 
2008 as part of the loan application process. (R.59) This was supported by 
Affidavit of Jeff Meyers stating, "I am personally familiar with the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the present dispute between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant" and "As part of his loan application, Defendant submitted to 
Plaintiff Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008 
respectively." (R.88-89) Robertson contends that he never met, talked to, or 
ever had any dealings with Jeff Meyers and that all dealings and 
communication with UCCU were between Robertson and Kevin Banks. 
(R.278-280) Kevin Banks is the only person who would have had knowledge 
of what was communicated between Robertson and UCCU in regards to the 
Income Statements. Any information Jeff Meyers may have in regards to Tax 
returns would either be secondhand hearsay, or speculation. We have no 
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affidavit or other testimony from Kevin Banks. In Summary Judgment, "the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party" Jackson v. Mateus. 70 R3d 78, 80 
(Utah 2003) Furthermore, "it is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed 
material facts in ruling on a summary judgment. It matters not that the 
evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even compelling. One sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the entry of 
summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 
(UtahCt.App. 1988) 
Robertson's statements "that the forms you have reflect honest, true, 
and accurate reflection of the income that I receive." (R.48) and "That these 
were unsigned income statements on IRS forms" "They were not income tax 
fillings" and that "At no time during the Loan Process was I asked to produce 
signed and filed tax returns for any year" (R.268) are sufficient to create an 
issue of fact and preclude summary judgment. Kevin banks was well aware 
that the income statements were unsigned. (R.268) The standard of review of 
what constitutes an Income Tax return should be the IRS Standard. If it is not 
signed, it is not a return. 
Robertson contends that the income statement is accurate and provides 
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sufficient income to provide the benefit which UCCU reasonably expected as 
provided for in the Note and that there was no material misrepresentation on 
his part. These are controverted issues of material fact and summary judgment 
was not appropriate. This court should reverse the findings of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ROBERTSONS FAILURE TO OCCUPY. 
The district court ruled that Robertson had breached the requirement 
under the Deed of Trust because he failed to occupy the property. Paragraph 6 
states: "Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's 
principal residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security 
Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as Borrower's principal 
residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender 
otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond 
Borrowers control." (emphasis added)(R.34) 
Robertson informed UCCU early on in the application process that this 
would be a "second" home and that Robertson was retaining his present 
residence. That the intent of the purchase was to go on a mission and that the 
detached 4 car garage would be perfect to store his belongings when he left. 
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He would also rent out his first house to pay for the mission expenses. UCCU 
was OK with this. (R.268) In the purchase agreement, Robertson had given 
the seller 30 days after closing to move out. The seller actually moved out and 
gave possession to Robertson on June 25, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Robertson 
transferred all the utilities into his name. On Saturday morning of June 27, 
2009, Robertson began to move his belongings into the house. While moving 
in, a letter came in the mail from James "Tucker" Hansen of the Law Firm of 
Hansen Wright Eddy & Haws, RC. representing UCCU, calling the home 
loan due and payable in full and threatening foreclosure if the full amount of 
$149,310.75 is not paid within 30 days. (R.271,794) Robertson swears in his 
Affidavit that it caused him to cease moving into the property. (R.271) This 
thwarted the very purpose for which the home was purchased and was 
certainly beyond Borrower's control. Even though Robertson did not move 
into the house, the terms of the contract regarding extenuating circumstances 
applied. These are controverted material facts and the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment. This court should reverse the decision of the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. 57-1-31 WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION 
Robertson's contention is that if any default had occurred, he had 
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previously cured any breach or default which may have existed under the cure 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 before the filing of this present action 
and was a valid defense. This material fact should have been considered and 
precludes summary judgment. Robertson's motion for summary judgment 
based on this same fact should have also been considered. (R.765-863) 
In the Memorandum Decision of the District Court of June 1, 2010, it 
states: "Prior to 1985, UCA. § 57-1-31 provided a debtor in default with a 
statutory opportunity to cure the default in a judicial foreclosure. Washington 
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 666(Utah App. 1990). 
Since this section of the Code was amended in 1985, no statutory opportunity 
to cure remains under this section if the beneficiary chooses to enforce his or 
her rights by judicial foreclosure. Id. At 666-667. Under UCA. § 57-1-23, "it 
is made optional with the beneficiary of the trust deed whether to foreclose the 
trust property after a breach of an obligation in a manner provided for 
foreclosure of mortgages or to have the trustee proceed under the power of 
sale provided therein." Security Title Co. v Payless Builders Supply, 407 P.2d 
141, 142 (Utah 1965). Because UCCU chose the option of commencing a 
judicial mortgage foreclosure action, UCA. § 57-1-31 is not applicable to this 
action." (R.871) 
This decision ignores the fact that UCCU first chose a Non Judicial 
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power of sale foreclosure. On November 9, 2009, a Notice of Substitution of 
Trustee and Notice of Default were recorded at the Utah County Recorders 
Office entry number 116540 and 116541. (R.771) These were also served on 
Robertson. Along with these was a document requesting Robertson perform 
"Pursuant to the provision of Section 57-1-31, Utah Code Annotated". 
(R.841) UCCU was aware of the cure provision of UCA. § 57-1-31, and 
demanded Robertson cure under that provision. UCA. § 57-1-31 states in part: 
"Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, 
become due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed,.. .the trustor.... 
at any time within three months of the filing for record of notice of default 
under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the 
beneficiary or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then 
due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually 
incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the 
trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other than that portion of the 
principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and thereby 
cure the existing default. After the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in 
interest has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed shall 
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be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred." (Emphasis added) 
Addendum (a) 
"Statutory construction begins and, if possible, ends with the statute's 
plain language. State v. Burns, 4 R3d 795 (Utah 2002); State v. Redd, 
992 P.2d 986, 990(Utah 1999)." 
On December 1, 2009, Robertson went into a branch of UCCU to pay the 
amount required under UCA. § 57-1-31 to reinstate the loan. He approached a 
teller who informed him that the account was in Special Collections and he 
could not take a payment. Robertson stated he was there to pay the amount 
needed to reinstate the loan. The teller said that he could not accept it. 
Robertson then asked for a letter that stated that he was in the branch with 
cash to reinstate the loan and they were refusing. The teller went to the branch 
manager and they made a phone call. The teller returned and informed 
Robertson that the special collections unit was calling their legal department. 
(R.828 ) Billing records indicate this conversation did take place. (R.106) The 
teller returned and informed Robertson that the amount was $885.93. 
Robertson gave the teller $900. in cash and received change back.(R.832) 
December 4, 2009, Robertson mailed a Notice of Cured Default pursuant to 
57-1-31. (R.843) On December 21,2009, Robertson received a loan 
Statement in writing from UCCU showing reinstatement with an amount due 
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on 01/01/10 of $885.93. (R.814) January 9,2010, Robertson sent a letter that 
a cancellation of the Notice of Default had not yet been executed. (R.846-847) 
On May 26, 2010, a cancellation of Notice of Default was Recorded, entry 
43446:2010 Utah County Recorder. (R.849) 
"Reinstatement," as it is used in section 57-1-31, is the curing of the 
default. In other words, the parties are returned to their former status as if the 
default had never occurred. If a trustor subsequently defaults again, the 
beneficiary must begin new foreclosure proceedings. It may not rely on the 
previous notice of default and declaration of acceleration. Progressive 
Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The loan had been reinstated. Robertson has paid every amount requested by 
UCCU in their Loan Statements received each month by Robertson. The 
Notice of Default has been recorded notifying all the world that the default 
has been cured and the parties returned to their former status as if the default 
had never occurred. 
A case may be made that Robertson did not pay the costs and expenses 
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and 
the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred as required. However, 
Robertson paid the amount set by the beneficiary as required by UCA. § 
57-1-31. UCCU determined the amount. The loan was reinstated and a 
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Cancellation of the Notice of Default was recorded, entry 43446:2010 Utah 
County Recorder, giving notice that any previous default no longer exists. 
UCCU also waived any right they may have had to request additional 
funds by failure to respond to Robertson's requests under RESPA 12 U.S.C. § 
2605(e) 
2605(e)(1)(a) Duty of loan servicer to respond to borrower inquiries 
(1) Notice of receipt of inquiry 
(A) In general 
If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a 
qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the 
borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such loan, the 
servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the 
correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal public holidays, 
Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken within 
such period, (emphasis added)(addendum e) 
UCCU never responded to either of the two requests by Robertson in 
regards to the cure of any default and so the only action they could take was to 
implement the actions requested by Robertson. They also had an obligation to 
send a written acknowledgment. Under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2) (adendum e) 
The servicer must do one of three things within sixty days of receiving the 
letter: (1) correct the borrower's account and inform the borrower of those 
corrections in writing; (2) investigate and provide a written explanation to the 
borrower of the reasons that the servicer believes the borrower's account is 
correct; or (3) investigate and provide a written explanation to the borrower of 
the reasons that the servicer cannot obtain the information that the borrower is 
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requesting. If UCCU would have done this, it would have given Robertson 
notice that he had failed to also pay other fees, even though they were never 
requested, and give him an opportunity to do so within the time period 
allowed under UCA 57-1-31 for curing the default. Having failed to do so, 
UCCU has waived any right they may have had to collect such fees. 
Any breach or default that may have existed has now been cured and 
the parties returned to their former status as if the default had never occurred. 
This all took place before the commencement of this action. This court should 
reverse the decision of the District Court and rule that any defaults prior to this 
have been cured and grant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
matter. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED UCCU HAD 
STANDING TO CONTINUE WITH THE JUDICAL FORECLOSURE 
BY COMPLIANCE TO THE DEED OF TRUST 
Robertson contends that UCCU has failed to comply with the 
provisions in the contract necessary to bring a judicial action against him, and 
thus does not have standing. The Court erred when it ruled that the letter of 
May 24, 2010, was sufficient to do so. 
Interpretation and application of acceleration provisions are strictly 
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interpreted according to the written terms and applied when included. 
Johnston v. Austin. 748 P.2d 1084 at 1089 (Utah, 1988) 
In Robertson's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment it states; "Although the Court has stated that 
there was proper notice, it is believed that the Court has been misled into 
believing that proper notice has been given. That Plaintiff has misled the 
court is unfortunate, however, the facts are clear; no proper notice has been 
given in this matter. Within the Deed of Trust Paragraph 20 states that prior 
to commencing litigation "Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, 
join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an individual litigant or the 
member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this 
Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any 
provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instrument, until 
such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given 
in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach 
and afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such 
notice to take corrective action." The Credit Union, the Trustee, and the 
attorneys representing them has/have never given proper notice under the 
provisions of Paragraph 15 before they commenced this litigation." emphasis 
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added (R. 649-650, 664) 
Paragraph "15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in 
connection with this Security Instrument must be in writing. Any notice to 
Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to 
have been given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when 
actually delivered to Borrower's notice address if sent by other means. 
Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless 
Applicable Law expressly requires otherwise. The notice address shall be 
the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice 
address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify Lender of 
Borrower's change of address. If Lender specifies a procedure for 
reporting Borrower's change of address, then Borrower shall only report a 
change of address through that specified procedure. There may be only 
one designated notice address under this Security Instrument at any one 
time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it 
by first class mail to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has 
designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice in 
connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been 
given to Lender until actually received by Lender. If any notice required 
by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the 
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Applicable Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement 
under this Security Instrument. (R.655) 
Robertson had designated the Notice address of 444 West Center 
Street, Provo, Utah 84601, in all his documents as the Notice address in the 
specific Notice Address Document at closing. UCCU was well aware of this 
address and had mailed all documents in the Non Judicial foreclosure to this 
address. UCCU contends that on May 24, 2010, they prepared and mailed a 
letter complying with the acceleration provisions of Paragraph 22 of the 
Trust Deed. Paragraph 22 states in part; "Acceleration: Remedies. Lender 
shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's 
breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not 
prior to acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law Provides 
otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to 
cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is 
given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure 
to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in 
acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the 
Property." The letter that UCCU mailed on May 24, 2010, was mailed to a 
partner of Robertson's attorney and also to the property address even though 
one of the main contentions of UCCU was that Robertson was not living 
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there, but never mailed to the designated notice address required by the trust 
deed. Robertson denies ever receiving such notice. In the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision of June 1, 2010, it states: "Paragraph 22 of the Deed 
of Trust provides a very specific process that must be followed prior to 
acceleration following a breach of any covenant by Robertson. Notice of a 
breach must specify: "(a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the 
default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice ... by which 
the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default will result 
in acceleration of the sums secured... and the sale of the property." UCCU 
sent a letter dated May 24, 2010, that satisfies the requirements of paragraph 
22 of the Deed of Trust." (R.869-870) Item C of that decision conveniently 
left out "is given to Borrower" in coming to it's conclusion and is material to 
whether the letter does or does not comply. The requirement of the trust deed 
at (c) is: a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to 
Borrower, by which the default must be cured; 
Notice is either (1) statutory, t. e., made so by legislative enactment; 
(2) actual, which brings the knowledge of a fact directly home to the 
party; or (3) constructive or implied, which is no more than evidence 
of facts which raise such a strong presumption of notice that equity 
will not allow the presumption to be rebutted. (Black's Law 
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Dictionary) 
Here notice given to Borrower would have to be (2) actual, which brings the 
knowledge of a fact directly home to the party. The date then in question, has 
to be not less than 30 days from the date that actual knowledge was given to 
the borrower. The District Court pointed out, "The notice gave Robertson 
until June 24, 2010, 30 days from the date of the notice, to cure the default." 
(R.870) but the date of the letter is not the date of notice. The date of notice 
would not be until actual notice was received. We have no certificate of 
mailing, and Robertson states in his affidavit that he never personally saw the 
letter until January 2011, well after this action was started. The District Court 
accepted that fact, but went on to rule "Although Robertson did not receive a 
copy of the notice, the notice was also sent to Robertson's attorney, Richard D 
Bradford. This fulfilled the notice requirement because 'an attorney is the 
agent of the client and knowledge of any material facts possessed by the 
attorney is imputed to the client" Von Hake v Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 194 n.3 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) This is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of 
the Deed of Trust. (R.870) Richard D Bradford was not the attorney of 
Robertson at the time the letter of May 24, 2010 was mailed, but was only a 
partner of Robertson's attorney M James Brady of Bradford and Brady, PC. 
Even if you impart that knowledge by a partner in the firm is knowledge to the 
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client, we still have to ascertain the date when actual Notice was given to the 
attorney to compute the "not less than 30 days" date from. The date the letter 
is produced is not the date that notice was actually received. Since we have no 
Notice of Service, we might look to URCP Rule 6, Time. 
6(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a 
prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him 
and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be 
added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under 
subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
included in the computation of any 3-day period under this 
subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the 
end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
If we assume the letter was mailed on May 24, 2010, the first day of counting 
would be the 25th, and if we add three days for service by mail we get June 27, 
2010 which is a Saturday so we move to Monday, June 29, 2010. This would 
give Robertson at least till then to comply with the requirements. That would 
mean that the soonest a judicial action could be started under the terms of the 
Deed of Trust would be June 30,2010. This present action was started on June 
25, 2010 and would be within the "not less than 30 days" time period. This 
court should reverse the decision of the district court and rule that UCCU has 
no standing until all terms of the Trust Deed are satisfied. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ROBERTSON'S 
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COUNTER CLAIM WITHOUT GIVING HIM HIS DAY IN COURT 
The district court committed err when it dismissed Robertson's counter 
claim without allowing discovery, or fully allowing him to present all the 
evidence and have his day in court. There are claims under RESPA 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(e)(addendum e) and FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692g § 809(addendum f) 
that exist even when a party is in default and which UCCU violated. 
"Parties to a suit, subject to all valid claims and defenses, are 
constitutionally entitled to litigate any justiciable controversy 
between them, i.e., they are entitled to their day in court. Both the 
due process clause of article I, section 7 and the open courts provision 
of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants 
will have this "day in court." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1998) ("Even the most limited reading of [the open courts] 
provision guarantees a day in court to all parties in disputed 
insurance claims."); • Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,675 
(Utah 1985) ("The clear language of the [open courts provision] 
guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based 
on fairness and equality." (emphasis added)); D Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) 
(holding that due process clause dictates that claimants have day in 
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court). 
Both the Utah Constitution and the US Constitution give Robertson rights to 
fully have his day in court and the actions of the district court has 
circumvented that. This court should reverse the decision of the district court 
and remand for further proceedings. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Comes now the Appellant, Mike L. Robertson, Sr. and requests that this 
court reverse the decision granting summary judgment in the district court. 
That this court rule that Robertson has cured any default that may have existed 
under the cure provisions of UCA § 57-1-31. That this court rule that UCCU 
has no standing until they comply with all of the terms of the contract between 
the parties. And that this court overturn the ruling dismissing the counter 
claim by Robertson and order discovery and further proceedings guaranteeing 
his day in court before a jury as provided by law. /\ s 
Dated this 2nd day of March, 2012 / / 
Mike L. Robertson, Sr. Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herby certify that I personally mailed two true and correct copies of 
the forgoing Appeal Brief on the 2nd day of March, 2012, by first class, U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
Paul D. Jarvis 
Hansen, Wright, Eddy, & Haws, PC 
233 S Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84602 
Ju 
Mike L. Robertson, Sr. Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. 57-1-31. Trust deeds -- Default in performance of obligations 
secured -- Reinstatement -- Cancellation of recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, 
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in 
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or the 
trustor's successor in interest in the trust property or any part of the trust 
property or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of 
record on the trust property or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, 
at any time within three months of the filing for record of notice of default 
under the trust deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the 
beneficiary or the beneficiary's successor in interest the entire amount then 
due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually 
incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the 
trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other than that portion of the 
principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure 
the existing default. After the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in interest 
has been paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed shall be 
reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided 
in Subsection (1), and a reasonable fee is paid for cancellation, including the 
cost of recording the cancellation of notice of default, the trustee shall 
execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of 
default under the trust deed; and any trustee who refuses to execute and record 
this cancellation within 30 days is liable to the person curing the default for all 
actual damages resulting from this refusal. A reconveyance given by the 
trustee or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a 
notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default 
under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is 
sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following 
form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
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The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book , Page , 
Records of County, (or filed of record (month\day\year), 
with recorder's entry No. , County), Utah, which notice of default 
refers to the trust deed executed by and as trustors, in 
which is named as beneficiary and as trustee, and filed for record 
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book , Page , 
Records of County, (or filed of record (month\day\year), 
with recorder's entry No. , County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
B. Rule 6. Time 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided 
under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays 
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of 
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued 
existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a 
court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action that has been 
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pending before it. 
(d) Notice of hearings. Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days 
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by 
these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be 
made on ex parte application. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is 
required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed 
period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under this 
subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
C. Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery, 
(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule 
governing disclosure and discovery in a practice area. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a 
party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of: 
(a)(l)(A)(i) each individual likely to have discoverable information 
supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying 
the subjects of the information; and 
(a)(l)(A)(ii) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, 
except for an adverse party, a summary of the expected testimony; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things in the possession or control of the party that 
the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and 
demonstrative exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed 
in accordance with paragraph (a)(5); 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all 
discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which such computation is 
based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered; 
(a)(1)(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to 
satisfy part or all of a judgment or to indemnify or reimburse for payments 
made to satisfy the judgment; and 
(a)(1)(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings. 
(a)(2) Timing of initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph 
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(a)(1) shall be made: 
(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after service of the first answer to the 
complaint; and 
(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 28 days after the plaintiff's first disclosure 
or after that defendant's appearance, whichever is later. 
(a)(3) Exemptions. 
(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making 
proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(3)(A)(ii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(3)(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4. 
(a)(3)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under 
paragraph (a)(1) are subject to discovery under paragraph (b). 
(a)(4) Expert testimony. 
(a)(4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a 
discovery request, provide to the other parties the following information 
regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under 
Rules 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the 
expert's name and qualifications, including a list of all publications authored 
within the preceding 10 years, and a list of any other cases in which the expert 
has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which the witness is expected to 
testify, (iii) all data and other information that will be relied upon by the 
witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the compensation to be paid for 
the witness's study and testimony. 
(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained from 
an expert witness either by deposition or by written report. A deposition shall 
not exceed four hours and the party taking the deposition shall pay the 
expert's reasonable hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall 
be signed by the expert and shall contain a complete statement of all opinions 
the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them. Such an expert 
may not testify in a party's case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly 
disclosed in the report. The party offering the expert shall pay the costs for the 
report. 
(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery. 
(a)(4)(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which 
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expert testimony is offered shall provide the information required by 
paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of fact discovery. Within 
seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing 
either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, 
or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, 
or the report shall be provided, within 28 days after the election is made. If no 
election is made, then no further discovery of the expert shall be permitted. 
(a)(4)(C)(ii) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for 
which expert testimony is offered shall provide the information required by 
paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (i) the date on which 
the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (ii) receipt of the written 
report or the taking of the expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may 
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The 
deposition shall occur, or the report shall be provided, within 28 days after the 
election is made. If no election is made, then no further discovery of the expert 
shall be permitted. 
(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the 
expert must agree on either a report or a deposition. If all parties opposing the 
expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be obtained only 
by deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30. 
(a)(4)(E) Summary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party intends to 
present evidence at trial under Rules 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence from 
any person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially employed 
to provide testimony in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of 
the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, that party must provide a 
written summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to 
testify in accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph (a)(4)(C). A 
deposition of such a witness may not exceed four hours. 
(a)(5) Pretrial disclosures. 
(a)(5)(A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, provide to 
other parties: 
(a)(5)(A)(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, unless solely for impeachment, separately 
identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may call; 
(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by transcript of a deposition and a copy of the transcript with the 
proposed testimony designated; and 
(a)(5)(A)(iii) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and 
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demonstrative exhibits, unless solely for impeachment, separately identifying 
those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer. 
(a)(5)(B) Disclosure required by paragraph (a)(5) shall be made at least 28 
days before trial. At least 14 days before trial, a party shall serve and file 
counter designations of deposition testimony, objections and grounds for the 
objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of exhibits. Other 
than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
objections not listed are waived unless excused by the court for good cause. 
(b) Discovery scope. 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the 
standards of proportionality set forth below. 
(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if: 
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources, the 
importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues; 
(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or 
expense; 
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and 
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case; 
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; 
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and 
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to 
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the 
parties' relative access to the information. 
(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing 
proportionality and relevance. To ensure proportionality, the court may enter 
orders under Rule 37. 
(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically 
stored information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or 
cost shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the 
nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, 
and any other information that will enable other parties to evaluate the claim. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable 
documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial 
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including 
the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only 
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
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materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain 
substantially equivalent materials by other means. In ordering discovery of 
such materials, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party. 
(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain 
without the showing required in paragraph (b)(5) a statement concerning the 
action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a 
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement about 
the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request 
is refused, the person may move for a court order under Rule 37. A statement 
previously made is (A) a written statement signed or approved by the person 
making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or other recording, or 
a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral 
statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(7) Trial preparation; experts. 
(b)(7)(A) Trial-preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures. 
Paragraph (b)(5) protects drafts of any report or disclosure required under 
paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded. 
(b)(7)(B) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a party's 
attorney and expert witnesses. Paragraph (b)(5) protects communications 
between the party's attorney and any witness required to provide disclosures 
under paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form of the communications, except 
to the extent that the communications: 
(b)(7)(B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony; 
(b)(7)(B)(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that 
the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or 
(b)(7)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that 
the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed. 
(b)(7)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may 
not, by interrogatories or otherwise, discover facts known or opinions held by 
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be 
called as a witness at trial. A party may do so only: 
(b)(7)(C)(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or 
(b)(7)(C)(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by 
other means. 
(b)(8) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials. 
(b)(8)(A) Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information 
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by claiming that it is privileged or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of 
the documents, communications, or things not produced in a manner that, 
without revealing the information itself, will enable other parties to evaluate 
the claim. 
(b)(8)(B) Information produced. If a party produces information that the party 
claims is privileged or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the 
producing party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis for 
it. After being notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or 
destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or 
disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may 
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of 
the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being 
notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must 
preserve the information until the claim is resolved, 
(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard 
discovery; extraordinary discovery. 
(c)(1) Methods of discovery. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written 
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or 
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other 
purposes; physical and mental examinations; requests for admission; and 
subpoenas other than for a court hearing or trial. 
(c)(2) Sequence and timing of discovery. Methods of discovery may be used 
in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery shall not 
delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph 
(a)(3), a party may not seek discovery from any source before that party's 
initial disclosure obligations are satisfied. 
(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or 
less in damages are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 1. 
Actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages are 
permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming 
$300,000 or more in damages are permitted standard discovery as described 
for Tier 3. Absent an accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, 
actions claiming non-monetary relief are permitted standard discovery as 
described for Tier 2. 
(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of determining standard discovery, 
the amount of damages includes the total of all monetary damages sought 
(without duplication for alternative theories) by all parties in all claims for 
relief in the original pleadings. 
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(c)(5) Limits on standard fact discovery. Standard fact discovery per side 
(plaintiffs collectively, defendants collectively, and third-party defendants 
collectively) in each tier is as follows. The days to complete standard fact 
discovery are calculated from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is 










$50,000 or less 
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$50,000 and less 

















































(c)(6) Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the limits 
established in paragraph (c)(5), a party shall file: 
(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits 
of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a stipulated statement that 
extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) 
and that each party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or 
(c)(6)(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits 
of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a motion for extraordinary 
discovery setting forth the reasons why the extraordinary discovery is 
necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) and certifying that the 
party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget and certifying that the 
party has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the other party in 
an effort to achieve a stipulation. 
(d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an 
organization; failure to disclose; initial and supplemental disclosures and 
responses. 
(d)(1) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the 
information then known or reasonably available to the party. 
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(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a 
corporation, partnership, association, or governmental agency, the party shall 
act through one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons, 
who shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the 
information then known or reasonably available to the party. 
(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because 
the party has not completed investigating the case or because the party 
challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or 
because another party has not made disclosures or responses. 
(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or 
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, 
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or 
the party shows good cause for the failure. 
(d)(5) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect 
in some important way, the party must timely provide the additional or correct 
information if it has not been made known to the other parties. The 
supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct 
information was not previously provided. 
(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure, 
request for discovery, response to a request for discovery and objection to a 
request for discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of 
record or by the party if the party is not represented. The signature of the 
attorney or party is a certification under Rule 11. If a request or response is not 
signed, the receiving party does not need to take any action with respect to it. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 11 or Rule 
37(eX 
(f) Filing. Except as required by these rules or ordered by the court, a party 
shall not file with the court a disclosure, a request for discovery or a response 
to a request for discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating 
that the disclosure, request for discovery or response has been served on the 
other parties and the date of service. 
D. Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
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such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
E. 12 USC 2605(e) 
(e) DUTY OF LOAN SERVICER TO RESPOND TO BORROWER 
INQUIRIES.— 
(1) NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF INQUIRY.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan 
receives a qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the 
borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such loan, the servicer 
shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence 
within 20 days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) 
unless the action requested is taken within such period. 
(B) QUALIFIED WRITTEN REQUEST—For purposes of this subsection, a 
qualified written request shall be a written correspondence, other than notice 
on a payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, 
that-
(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and 
account of the borrower; and 
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the 
extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to 
the servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower. 
(2) ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INQUIRY.—Not later than 60 days 
(excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) after the receipt 
from any borrower of any qualified written request under paragraph (1) and, if 
applicable, before taking any action with respect to the inquiry of the 
borrower, the servicer shall— 
(A) make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower, including the 
crediting of any late charges or penalties, and transmit to the borrower a 
written notification of such correction (which shall include the name and 
telephone number of a representative of the servicer who can provide 
assistance to the borrower); 
(B) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written 
explanation or clarification that includes 
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(i) to the extent applicable, a statement of the reasons for which the servicer 
believes the account of the borrower is correct as determined by the servicer; 
and 
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the 
office or department of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the 
borrower; or 
(C) after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written 
explanation or clarification that includes-
(i) information requested by the borrower or an explanation of why the 
information requested is unavailable or cannot be obtained by the servicer; 
and 
(ii) the name and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the 
office or department of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the 
borrower. 
(3) PROTECTION OF CREDIT RATING.—During the 60-day period 
beginning on the date of the servicer's receipt from any borrower of a 
qualified written request relating to a dispute regarding the borrower's 
payments, a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue 
payment, owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified 
written request, to any consumer reporting agency (as such term is defined 
under section 603 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
F. 15 USC 1692g§ 809. Validation of debts 
(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless 
the following information is contained in the initial communication or the 
consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice contain-
ing— 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of 
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 
disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a 
copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such 
verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector; and 
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(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the 
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with 
the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the 
current creditor. 
(b) If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 
period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 
disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the 
original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or 
any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification 
of the debt or any copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the 
original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name 
and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise 
violate this title may continue during the 30-day period referred to in 
subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in 
writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the 
consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any 
collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may 
not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's 
right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original 
creditor. 
(c) The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this 
section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by 
the consumer. 
(d) A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall 
not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a). 
(e) The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to 
the collection of a debt and is expressly required by the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, title V of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, or any provision of 
Federal or State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or 
any regulation prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be 
treated as an initial communication in connection with debt collection for 
purposes of this section. 
53 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
